Es incuestionable el hecho de la evolución, así como la admisión de una realidad previa de la cual partir, sea creada o no. Pero luce cuestionable el mecanismo de la evolución en clave de “selección natural” cuando se la entiende como netamente naturalista. El evolucionismo darwinista no tiene fundamento suficiente para afirmar que las especies evolucionan de modo totalmente aleatorio y sin finalidad definida. Los más recientes descubrimientos socavan los cimientos del darwinismo (J. Enrique Cáceres-Arrieta), y nos hablan de un (...) Diseñador creando el universo de la nada en un tiempo finito y aceptando la evidencia del Big-Bang (William Lane Craig). Otros tipos de evolucionismo, aunque rechazan la teleología, admiten sin embargo, la teleonomía, que no es incompatible con la tesis agustiniana del “creacionismo evolutivo”. En estos tipos de evolucionismo sí cabe una tendencialidad antrópica como la defendida por Agustín, a través de sus razones seminales-causales y de los distintos modos de creación derivados de aquel “simul et in ictu” creacional. Las distintas creaciones virtuales, también simultáneas y derivadas de la creación propia “ex nihilo”, no implican que sean efectivas “simul” también las especies o prototipos. Una cosa es el hecho de la creación simultánea y otro el de su real y existencial efecto en el tiempo. En esta idea encontramos la fundamentación para defender un creacionismo evolutivo a lo agustiniano, que podría sintonizar con otros evolucionismos al estilo de X. Zubiri, K. Rahner, Pedro Laín Entralgo,… Palabras clave: creacionismo; creacionismo evolutivo; creación virtual; evolucionismo; razón seminal; fixismo (o fijismo); principio o sentido antrópico. Saint Augustine versus Darwin: Evolutionary Creacionism of ‘Seminal Reasons’Evolution is an unquestionable fact, and so is the admission of a previous reality from which to start up, whether created or not. But the mechanism of evolution in terms of “natural selection” does look questionable, when the latter is understood as entirely naturalistic. Darwinist evolutionism has no sufficient grounds to assert that species evolve in a totally random way, without a defined end. The most recent discoveries undermine the foundations of Darwinism (J. Enrique Cáceres-Arrieta), and tell us about a Designer creating the universe out of nothing in a finite time, accepting the big bang theory (William Lane Craig). Other types of evolutionism, while rejecting teleology, do admit teleonomy, which is not incompatible with the Augustinian thesis of “evolutionary creationism”. In these kinds of evolutionism it is indeed possible to speak of anthropic tendencies, as was defended by Augustine by means of his seminal-causal reasons and the different modes of creation derived from that creational “simul et in ictu”. The different virtual creations, simultaneous as well and derived from the “ex nihilo” creation, do not entail that the species or prototypes should also be effective “simul”. One thing is the fact of simultaneous creation; a different one is its real and existential effect over time. In this idea we find the grounds on which to defend an Augustinian-like evolutionary creationism, which might be compatible with other types of evolutionism like those of X. Zubiri, K. Rahner, Pedro Laín Entralgo,… Keywords : Creationism;Evolutionary Creationism; Virtual Creation; Evolutionism; Seminal Reason; Fixism; Anthropic Sense or Principle. (shrink)

In this paper we discuss the extent to which the very existence of substructural logics puts the Tarskian conception of logical systems in jeopardy. In order to do this, we highlight the importance of the presence of different levels of entailment in a given logic, looking not only at inferences between collections of formulae but also at inferences between collections of inferences—and more. We discuss appropriate refinements or modifications of the usual Tarskian identity criterion for logical systems, and propose an (...) alternative of our own. After that, we consider a number of objections to our account and evaluate a substantially different approach to the same problem. (shrink)

Anti-exceptionalism about logic states that logical theories have no special epistemological status. Such theories are continuous with scientific theories. Contemporary anti-exceptionalists include the semantic paradoxes as a part of the elements to accept a logical theory. Exploring the Buenos Aires Plan, the recent development of the metainferential hierarchy of ST\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {ST}}$$\end{document}-logics shows that there are multiple options to deal with such paradoxes. There is a whole ST\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} (...) \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {ST}}$$\end{document}-based hierarchy, of which LP\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {LP}}$$\end{document} and ST\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {ST}}$$\end{document} themselves are only the first steps. This means that the logics in this hierarchy are also options to analyze the inferential patterns allowed in a language that contains its own truth predicate. This paper explores these responses analyzing some reasons to go beyond the first steps. We show that LP\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {LP}}$$\end{document}, ST\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {ST}}$$\end{document} and the logics of the ST\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {ST}}$$\end{document}-hierarchy offer different diagnoses for the same evidence: the inferences and metainferences the agents endorse in the presence of the truth-predicate. But even if the data are not enough to adopt one of these logics, there are other elements to evaluate the revision of classical logic. Which is the best explanation for the logical principles to deal with semantic paradoxes? How close should we be to classical logic? And mainly, how could a logic obey the validities it contains? From an anti-exceptionalist perspective, we argue that ST\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {ST}}$$\end{document}-metainferential logics in general—and STTω\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {STT}}_{\omega }$$\end{document} in particular—are the best available options to explain the inferential principles involved with the notion of truth. (shrink)

In this paper, we present a non-trivial and expressively complete paraconsistent naïve theory of truth, as a step in the route towards semantic closure. We achieve this goal by expressing self-reference with a weak procedure, that uses equivalences between expressions of the language, as opposed to a strong procedure, that uses identities. Finally, we make some remarks regarding the sense in which the theory of truth discussed has a property closely related to functional completeness, and we present a sound and (...) complete three-sided sequent calculus for this expressively rich theory. (shrink)

When discussing Logical Pluralism several critics argue that such an open-minded position is untenable. The key to this conclusion is that, given a number of widely accepted assumptions, the pluralist view collapses into Logical Monism. In this paper we show that the arguments usually employed to arrive at this conclusion do not work. The main reason for this is the existence of certain substructural logics which have the same set of valid inferences as Classical Logic—although they are, in a clear (...) sense, non-identical to it. We argue that this phenomenon can be generalized, given the existence of logics which coincide with Classical Logic regarding a number of metainferential levels—although they are, again, clearly different systems. We claim this highlights the need to arrive at a more refined version of the Collapse Argument, which we discuss at the end of the paper. (shrink)

Los vínculos entre datos, algoritmos y dispositivos configuran desarrollos de sistemas fuertes de inteligencia artificial que impactan en los modos de ser y estar en el mundo. El artículo se orienta establecer implicaciones psicopolíticas de las inteligencias artificiales sobre el cuerpo, mediante una hermenéutica analógica de textos (2010-2021) en sus fases sintáctica, semántica y pragmática, que permita establecer una analogía entre los posibles beneficios, riesgos y oportunidades para los cuerpos y las subjetividades. Los resultados indican implicaciones en la reconfiguración del (...) cuerpo en los escenarios digital, el mercado de los perfiles o nuevas formas de ser y estar en el mundo digital, así como el ejercicio de una psicopolítica en diferentes etapas: manipulación, modificación de conductas y gobernanza. Las conclusiones apuntan a nuevas prácticas del neoliberalismo orientadas a la interioridad de los sujetos y a la comercialización de los perfiles configurados mediante sistemas de inteligencia artificial. (shrink)

Supported by the works of Mijail Bajtin, we approach the study of Patria respecting its identity as a literary work and, at the same time, integrating its unavoidable reference to the history of the Basque Country. The hypothesis is that Patria takes advantage of the resources of the literary genre to become a great dialogical novel, providing a valuable focus to the "great conversation" about ETA terrorism. To confirm this hypothesis, we analyze the macrostructure of the novel, as well as (...) the polyphony and dialogue in its various narrative voices, at the level of the microstructure of the story. These analyzes invite us to suggest the notion of mimesis of social validities to explain the type of "realism" that we can find in the novel. (shrink)

Latin is one of the best documented and most extensively studied of any language: nearly every area has been subject to continued and intense scrutiny, with ideas from recent subfields of linguistics providing a fresh look at some old topics. The Latin future imperative, the form that conveys commands for non-immediate execution, constitutes precisely such a topic in Latin linguistics: from the Roman Imperial period on, students have demarcated the usages, syntax and context-specific features associated with this form; more recently, (...) scholars have applied ideas from various linguistic subfields to achieve new insights. Given that the –toimperative is so well understood, it might come as a surprise to find that some matters pertaining to it are still debated. This paper will address four such contested areas: first, its register ; second, the form's politeness ; third, the temporal scope of the –toimperative ; and fourth, the sensitivity of the form to social factors, that is, to the identity of the speaker and the addressee. (shrink)

Διαθέτουμε δύο αντίγραφα (το ένα του Μελετίου, το άλλο του Lyons) μιας επιγραφής από την Ήπειρο που είναι αναθηματική σε κάποιο ποταμό Ωρωπό. Η επιγραφή, χαμένη σή- μέρα, βρισκόταν στο ρωμαϊκό υδραγωγείο της Νικόπολης, στο ύψος του Αγίου Γεωργίου. Η πιο ενδιαφέρουσα διαφορά μεταξύ των δύο διατηρουμένων αντιγράφων εντοπίζεται στην ανάγνωση του υδρωνυμίου (Μελέτιος : ΩΡΟΡΟΝ, Lyons : ΩΡΩΠΩ). Συζητούνται οι διαφορές και προτείνεται μια νέα υπόθεση : τ]φ 'Ρωγών ποταμω.

The aim of this paper is to show that it’s not a good idea to have a theory of truth that is consistent but ω-inconsistent. In order to bring out this point, it is useful to consider a particular case: Yablo’s Paradox. In theories of truth without standard models, the introduction of the truth-predicate to a first order theory does not maintain the standard ontology. Firstly, I exhibit some conceptual problems that follow from so introducing it. Secondly, I show that (...) in second order theories with standard semantics the same procedure yields a theory that doesn’t have models. So, while having an ω- inconsistent theory is a bad thing, having an unsatisfiable theory of truth is actually worse. This casts doubts on whether the predicate in question is, after all, a truthpredicate for that language. Finally, I present some alternatives to prove an inconsistency adding plausible principles to certain theories of truth. (shrink)

I review and challenge the views on simplicity and its role in linguistics put forward by Ludlow. In particular, I criticize the claim that simplicity—in the sense pertinent to science—is nothing more than ease of use or “user-friendliness”, motivated by economy of labor. I argue that Ludlow’s discussion fails to do justice to the diversity of factors that are relevant to simplicity considerations. This, in turn, leads to the neglect of crucial cases in which the rationale for simplification is unmistakably (...) epistemic, as well as instances where simplicity is part of the content of substantive, empirical hypotheses. I illustrate these points with examples from the history of generative linguistics, such as: the shaping influence exerted by simplicity, via its involvement in the notion of “linguistically significant generalization”, its methodological and substantive contribution to the goal of explanatory adequacy, and its central role in the Minimalist Program’s search “beyond explanatory adequacy”. (shrink)

Recently, it has been proposed to understand a logic as containing not only a validity canon for inferences but also a validity canon for metainferences of any finite level. Then, it has been shown that it is possible to construct infinite hierarchies of ‘increasingly classical’ logics—that is, logics that are classical at the level of inferences and of increasingly higher metainferences—all of which admit a transparent truth predicate. In this paper, we extend this line of investigation by taking a somehow (...) different route. We explore logics that are different from classical logic at the level of inferences, but recover some important aspects of classical logic at every metainferential level. We dub such systems meta-classical non-classical logics. We argue that the systems presented deserve to be regarded as logics in their own right and, moreover, are potentially useful for the non-classical logician. (shrink)

It is widely accepted that a theory of truth for arithmetic should be consistent, but -consistency is a highly desirable feature for such theories. The point has already been made for first-order languages, though the evidence is not entirely conclusive. We show that in the second-order case the consequence of adopting -inconsistent theories of truth are considered: the revision theory of nearly stable truth T # and the classical theory of symmetric truth FS. Briefly, we present some conceptual problems with (...) ω-inconsistent theories, and demonstrate some technical results that support our criticisms of such theories. (shrink)

In this article, we will present a number of technical results concerning Classical Logic, ST and related systems. Our main contribution consists in offering a novel identity criterion for logics in general and, therefore, for Classical Logic. In particular, we will firstly generalize the ST phenomenon, thereby obtaining a recursively defined hierarchy of strict-tolerant systems. Secondly, we will prove that the logics in this hierarchy are progressively more classical, although not entirely classical. We will claim that a logic is to (...) be identified with an infinite sequence of consequence relations holding between increasingly complex relata: formulae, inferences, metainferences, and so on. As a result, the present proposal allows not only to differentiate Classical Logic from ST, but also from other systems sharing with it their valid metainferences. Finally, we show how these results have interesting consequences for some topics in the philosophical logic literature, among them for the debate around Logical Pluralism. The reason being that the discussion concerning this topic is usually carried out employing a rivalry criterion for logics that will need to be modified in light of the present investigation, according to which two logics can be non-identical even if they share the same valid inferences. (shrink)

Three studies are presented to validate the Spanish version of Oliver and Raney’s eudaimonic and hedonic motivations scale. In Study 1, 132 university students watched a dramatic film, filling out the scales to evaluate motivations regarding cinema consumption and reception processes. Eudaimonic motivation was associated with deeper cognitive processes during the reception and stronger identification with the protagonist. Study 2 evaluated the test-retest reliability of the eudaimonic and hedonic motivations scale. In Study 3, statistically significant age differences were observed in (...) hedonic and eudaimonic motivations. Furthermore, convergent correlations were detected between hedonic and eudaimonic motivations and preferences of different film genres. These results allow us to conclude that the Spanish version of the hedonic and eudaimonic motivations scale presents adequate psychometric properties, thus being convergent with those obtained by Oliver and Raney. (shrink)

In this note we shall argue that Milne’s new effort does not refute Truthmaker Maximalism. According to Truthmaker Maximalism, every truth has a truthmaker. Milne has attempted to refute it using the following self-referential sentence M: This sentence has no truthmaker. Essential to his refutation is that M is like the Gödel sentence and unlike the Liar, and one way in which Milne supports this assimilation is through the claim that his proof is essentially object-level and not semantic. In Section (...) 2, we shall argue that Milne is still begging the question against Truthmaker Maximalism. In Section 3, we shall argue that even assimilating M to the Liar does not force the truthmaker maximalist to maintain the ‘dull option’ that M does not express a proposition. There are other options open and, though they imply revising the logic in Milne’s reasoning, this is not one of the possible revisions he considers. In Section 4, we shall suggest that Milne’s proof requires an implicit appeal to semantic principles and notions. In Section 5, we shall point out that there are two important dissimilarities between M and the Gödel sentence. Section 6 is a brief summary and conclusion. (shrink)

There are a considerable number of logics that do not seem to share the same inferential principles. Intuitionistic logics do not include the law of the exclude.

According to Etchemendy, in attempting to offer an analysis of the modal features of the intuitive concept of logical consequence, Tarski has committed a modal fallacy. In this paper, I consider the thesis according to it is posible to analyze the modals properties of concept of logical consequence through of a generalization on set-theoretical interpretations. As is known, some philosophers have tried to argue for the transit from the general to the modal by showing that there are enough settheoretic interpretations (...) so as to be able to represent the modal features of the intuitive concept of consequence. As is also known, those people have encountered a lot of difficulties. In the present paper, I will try to show that those problems are related not with the specific possibility of accounting for the modal features by means of a set-theoretic notion of model but with the possibility of coming up with a precise mathematical theory for the concept of interpretation, and, as such, they can be solved by way of appealing to the usual solutions to this problem. (shrink)

This paper aims to restore, from the political thought of Merleau-Ponty, the rightful place of conflict. To achieve this hypothetical premise it is necessary to consider some issues that are woven into possible readings of the origin or foundation of politics. First, tracing back to the original cartesian proposition that the body is related with extensive substance invalid when detecting who we are. Then, considering the reading Merleau-Ponty makes of Machiavelli considering the notion of riot or mass under a conflicting (...) structure of politics in relation to the subject. In this regard, it is noted from this reading, the conditions proposed by Merleau-Ponty to highlight the importance of the singular in a politically shared space. And finally, to understand these problem areas of the history of philosophy as their own "world of life" where the contingent has a particular sense understood as the ontological place of the practical subject. Thus, in this context, it is possible to reconcile from Merleau-Ponty in the area of the contingent, body and language; what is felt and thought; perceived and settled. To understand the features of sedimentation helps to the formation of the localized subject; that is, it habituated or instituted. (shrink)

Según la Propositional Attitude View (PAV), un hablante es competente en su idioma en virtud de poseer actitudes proposicionales cuyo contenido es su gramática interna. En este artículo desarrollo una objeción a PAV, llamada �el reto de la integración�, originalmente propuesto por Stich (1978) y Evans (1981), y que está constituido por dos premisas: (1) las actitudes proposicionales se caracterizan por su integración inferencial, y (2) los estados que contienen información gramatical no están inferencialmente integrados. En este artículo considero y (...) rechazo las respuestas a este argumento formuladas por Dwyer y Pietroski (1996), Higginbotham (1987) y Knowles (2000). (shrink)

En Paradojas, Paradojas y mas Paradojas se analiza de modo claro y preciso un problema fundamental: Que es una paradoja y cual es su importancia en la filosofia contemporanea? El libro pone al alcance del lector no especializado una seleccion de las paradojas mas conocidas e inquietantes, y realiza un analisis y discusion que permite que el lector pueda tener una comprension profunda de ellas y de las alternativas que surgen frente a ellas. Las paradojas son un fenomeno multidisciplinario: la (...) verdad, la racionalidad, el conocimiento, la justificacion y el infinito son algunos de los conceptos que en diferentes campos del saber han sido afectados por ellas. (shrink)

Quid ais has as its two main functions in Latin to express surprise (“what are you saying?”), and to get the addressee’s attention (“tell me something…”); the latter type has a commanding tone. It is proven that quid ais in Plautus has a decidedly male character; that is, he avoided giving the phrase to women. To explain this finding, it is noted that 91% of instances of quid ais in Plautus are of the second “attention-getting” type. With its imperatival force, (...) this quid ais was probably not felt to be appropriate for Plautus’ female characters whose speech is generally more polite and deferential than male speech. Indeed, in the three cases when a woman does utter the phrase, she either assumes a male role, or belongs to a type which in recent scholarship has been shown to have a “commanding” style of speech: the meretrix or the uxor dotata. (shrink)

Jaspers, using Weber as a model, makes a negative critique of Phenomenology, Neo-Kantism and modern Human Sciences, althoug he admires the discipline and clarity of thought of the two first philosophic movements.

RESUMEN El Servicio de Extensión Bibliotecaria es el medio adecuado que tiene la biblioteca para expandirse hacia la comunidad, de esa forma permite que aquellos usuarios que no la visitan hagan uso de sus servicios y documentos. Sin embargo, pocos conocen su historia y evolución a través del tiempo. Se muestra una revisión bibliográfica y el estado actual de este servicio. Los elementos incluidos en esta recolección abarcan publicaciones periódicas, sitios web, revistas electrónicas, publicados entre el siglo XVIII y el (...) presente. El documento pretende brindar una aproximación histórica al servicio de extensión bibliotecaria en las bibliotecas. ABSTRACT The Library Extension Service is the appropriate method a library has to expand into the community in a way that users who don’t visit it use its services and documents. However, just a few people know its history and development through time. A bibliographic review is shown along with the current state of this service. The elements included in it cover regular publications, web sites and electronic journals published from the XVIII century to the present time. The paper expects to provide a historical approach to the library extension service in libraries. (shrink)

The consolidation of the informational paradigm in molecular biology research concluded on a system to convert the epistemic object into an operational technological object and a stable epistemic product. However, the acceptance of the informational properties of genetic acids failed to clarify the meaning of the concept of information. The “information”’ as a property of the genetic molecules remained as an informal notion that allows the description of the mechanism of inheritance, but it was not specified in a logic–semantic structure. (...) The metaphorical implications associated with the idea of genes as molecules with meaning, questioned the linguistics that seemed too foreign to molecular biology. A reformulation of the concept of information in molecular biology was developed upon the theory of Claude Shannon. The node for the structural coupling between biology, physics and information theory was the identification of an analog structure between the coded messages of Shannon’s theory. (shrink)

Adding a transparent truth predicate to a language completely governed by classical logic is not possible. The trouble, as is well-known, comes from paradoxes such as the Liar and Curry. Recently, Cobreros, Egré, Ripley and van Rooij have put forward an approach based on a non-transitive notion of consequence which is suitable to deal with semantic paradoxes while having a transparent truth predicate together with classical logic. Nevertheless, there are some interesting issues concerning the set of metainferences validated by this (...) logic. In this paper, we show that this logic, once it is adequately understood, is weaker than classical logic. Moreover, the logic is in a way similar to the paraconsistent logic LP. (shrink)

It is widely accepted that classical logic is trivialized in the presence of a transparent truth-predicate. In this paper, we will explain why this point of view must be given up. The hierarchy of metainferential logics defined in Barrio et al. and Pailos recovers classical logic, either in the sense that every classical inferential validity is valid at some point in the hierarchy ), or because a logic of a transfinite level defined in terms of the hierarchy shares its (...) validities with classical logic. Each of these logics is consistent with transparent truth—as is shown in Pailos —, and this suggests that, contrary to standard opinions, transparent truth is after all consistent with classical logic. However, Scambler presents a major challenge to this approach. He argues that this hierarchy cannot be identified with classical logic in any way, because it recovers no classical antivalidities. We embrace Scambler’s challenge and develop a new logic based on these hierarchies. This logic recovers both every classical validity and every classical antivalidity. Moreover, we will follow the same strategy and show that contingencies need also be taken into account, and that none of the logics so far presented is enough to capture classical contingencies. Then, we will develop a multi-standard approach to elaborate a new logic that captures not only every classical validity, but also every classical antivalidity and contingency. As a€truth-predicate can be added to this logic, this result can be interpreted as showing that, despite the claims that are extremely widely accepted, classical logic does not trivialize in the context of transparent truth. (shrink)

To attain native-like competence, second language (L2) learners must establish mappings between familiar speech sounds and new phoneme categories. For example, Spanish learners of English must learn that [d] and [ð], which are allophones of the same phoneme in Spanish, can distinguish meaning in English (i.e. /deɪ/ ‘day’ and /ðeɪ/ ‘they’). Because adult listeners are less sensitive to allophonic than phonemic contrasts in their native language (L1), novel target language contrasts between L1 allophones may pose special difficulty for L2 learners. (...) We investigate whether advanced Spanish late-learners of English overcome native language mappings to establish new phonological relations between familiar phones. We report behavioral and magnetoencepholographic (MEG) evidence from two experiments that measured the sensitivity and pre-attentive processing of three listener groups (L1 English, L1 Spanish, and advanced Spanish late-learners of English) to differences between three nonword stimulus pairs ([idi]-[iði], [idi]-[iɾi], and [iði]-[iɾi]) which differ in phones that play a different functional role in Spanish and English. Spanish and English listeners demonstrated greater sensitivity (larger d’ scores) for nonword pairs distinguished by phonemic than by allophonic contrasts, mirroring previous findings. Spanish late-learners demonstrated sensitivity (large d’ scores and MMN responses) to all three contrasts, suggesting that these L2 learners may have established a novel [d]-[ð] contrast despite the phonological relatedness of these sounds in the L1. Our results suggest that phonological relatedness influences perceived similarity, as evidenced by the results of the native speaker groups, but may not cause persistent difficulty for advanced L2 learners. Instead, L2 learners are able to use cues that are present in their input to establish new mappings between familiar phones. (shrink)

In some recent articles, Cobreros, Egré, Ripley, & van Rooij have defended the idea that abandoning transitivity may lead to a solution to the trouble caused by semantic paradoxes. For that purpose, they develop the Strict-Tolerant approach, which leads them to entertain a nontransitive theory of truth, where the structural rule of Cut is not generally valid. However, that Cut fails in general in the target theory of truth does not mean that there are not certain safe instances of Cut (...) involving semantic notions. In this article we intend to meet the challenge of answering how to regain all the safe instances of Cut, in the language of the theory, making essential use of a unary recovery operator. To fulfill this goal, we will work within the so-called Goodship Project, which suggests that in order to have nontrivial naïve theories it is sufficient to formulate the corresponding self-referential sentences with suitable biconditionals. Nevertheless, a secondary aim of this article is to propose a novel way to carry this project out, showing that the biconditionals in question can be totally classical. In the context of this article, these biconditionals will be essentially used in expressing the self-referential sentences and, thus, as a collateral result of our work we will prove that none of the recoveries expected of the target theory can be nontrivially achieved if self-reference is expressed through identities. (shrink)